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Abstract
This article shows that bettor sentiment for higher scores in soccer matches does
not affect betting returns from over/under 2.5 goals bets, even though the volume
wagered is highly concentrated on the over bet. Strong competition and high price
transparency seem to prevent bookmakers from systematically exploiting bettor sen-
timent.
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1 Introduction
Sports betting is a multi-billion dollar business. FIFA (2011) estimates that sports betting
generated between $350 and $400 billion in 2011 while the sports industry itself gener-
ated around $300 billion. The dominant form of sports betting is bookmaker betting.
Bookmakers act as dealers by announcing the odds or point spreads that reflect the prices
against which bettors can place their bets. Thereby, bookmakers enter the opposite posi-
tion of each bet. As long as bettor preferences and perceptions are unbiased, bookmakers
do best by setting informationally efficient odds that reflect the true winning probability
of the underlying event. Otherwise, bookmakers can sustain large losses if bettors are
able to recognize and exploit the biased odds (Levitt, 2004). In the presence of senti-
mental bettors who prefer bets with particular characteristics and who do not necessarily
choose the bets with the highest expected return, optimal bookmaker pricing becomes
more complex. Popular examples of bettor sentiment include the optimistic/perception
bias (e.g., Kuypers, 2000; Levitt, 2004; Page, 2009) which causes bettors to overrate the
winning probability of certain teams, and the loyalty bias (e.g., Forrest & Simmons, 2008;
Franck, Verbeek, & Nu¨esch, 2011) which prevents bettors from betting against the team
they support. Bettor sentiment leads to an asymmetric volume demand even when the
bookmaker odds reflect the true winning probability of the underlying event.
This paper tests whether bettor sentiment affects the odds offered by bookmakers.
Levitt (2004) argues that bookmakers can earn higher profits by reducing the odds for
more heavily demanded bets, whereas the model of Franck et al. (2011) shows that, given
a highly elastic demand, bookmakers should increase the odds offered for more heavily
demanded bets. Empirical evidence on the effect of bettor sentiment on bookmaker odds
is mixed. Avery and Chevalier (1999), L. Woodland and Woodland (1994), Levitt (2004)
and Paul and Weinbach (2007) show that the returns for bets with higher sentimental
betting volumes are abnormally low. Forrest and Simmons (2008) and Franck et al. (2011),
however, find higher returns for bets with high bettor sentiment. And while Braun and
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Kvasnicka (2011) find both upward and downward biases, Page (2009) does not find any
evidence of biased odds due to bettor sentiment. Hence, the cumulative evidence on the
effect of bettor sentiment on bookmaker pricing is weak and/or inconsistent.
One difficulty in establishing a link between bettor sentiment and bookmaker pricing
is that actual betting volume data is often missing.1 The previous literature typically
employs proxy measures for sentimental betting demand such as the advice of experts,
the historical success or prestige of teams (Avery & Chevalier, 1999), the difference in mean
home attendance between the two opposing teams (Forrest & Simmons, 2008; Franck et
al., 2011) or the number of bets placed from a betting tournament with a fixed entry fee
(Levitt, 2004). Rather than relying on proxies for sentimental betting volume, we analyze
the actual volume data of a large European bookmaker.
A second difficulty in establishing a link between bettor sentiment and bookmaker
pricing is that bettor sentiment is often correlated with other confounders such as bettor
risk or skewness preferences (Quandt, 1986; Golec & Tamarkin, 1998) and bookmaker price
adjustments due to the risk of the underlying event (Shin, 1991). We avoid this problem
by investigating betting returns and volume percentages of the popular over/under 2.5
goals betting market on soccer matches.2 This market is beneficial for three reasons: First,
there are only two possible outcomes. An under 2.5 goals (hereafter under) bet wins if
the total score of both teams is 2 or less and vice versa for the over 2.5 goals (hereafter
over) bet. Second, the objective probability of either event is close to 50%, so that risk
considerations of both bettors and bookmakers do not affect our results. Third, bettors
exhibit a natural preference for high match scores because cheering for a high score is more
attractive than betting against it (Paul & Weinbach, 2009; B. Woodland & Woodland,
2010). Hence, our setting allows a clean and simple analysis of whether bettor sentiment
really affects bookmaker odds.
1Paul and Weinbach (2007) is an exception, as they have volume data of bets on 256 NFL matches
provided by the online bookmaker Sportsbook.com.
2The over/under 2.5 goals betting market is the second largest market after the three-way market on
home win, draw or away win according to the Betfair volume data on soccer matches from the 2011/12
season of the English Premier League provided by fracsoft.com.
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2 Data and Methodology
We use data on the volume percentages of money wagered on each side of the over/under
bet. The betting volume data was provided by the bookmaker Tipico, which is one
of the leading sports betting vendors in Germany. In addition to the online betting
portal, Tipico has over 1,000 betting shops in several European countries. The original
data sample included 4,491 soccer matches played worldwide in 220 different leagues and
competitions between November 1st, 2011 and December 7th, 2011. The corresponding
odds information was collected from the website oddsportal.com. 372 observations were
deleted because bookmaker odds could not be matched.3 Therefore, the final sample
consists of 4,119 matches.
The website oddsportal.com publishes both opening and closing decimal odds. The
opening odds are the first odds published by a bookmaker, usually one to two weeks in
advance, whereas the closing odds are the last odds offered in the pre-play period before
the match starts. Decimal odds denote the payoff of a successful bet. For example, if
the odds for an over bet are 2.50, a one dollar wager pays $2.50 if the total score is
three or more. We converted the decimal odds into prices, which are the reciprocal of
the decimal odds (e.g., 1
2.50
= 0.40). These prices indicate how much a bettor has to
invest in order to collect $1 in the event of a successful bet (Forrest & Simmons, 2008).
Figure 1a shows the changes between the opening price popening and closing price pclosing
of Tipico for both the over and the under bets. For about 60% of all bets, the closing
price is the same as the opening price. The price changes in the remaining 40% of the
matches appear to be small and symmetrically distributed around zero for both the over
and the under bets. Price adjustments do not systematically differ between the two
sides of the contract, which seems plausible given that information inflow is randomly
affecting the winning probability of the over/under bets. The small and symmetric price
adjustments are remarkable, however, when considering that the incoming betting volume
3The betting volume does not significantly differ between matches with and without missing odds infor-
mation.
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(a) Price change (popening − pclosing) (b) Betting volume
Figure 1: Distribution of price changes and volume percentages of over/under 2.5 goals bets
is highly asymmetric. Figure 1b illustrates the distribution of volume percentages for the
over/under bets and shows that the betting volume on the over bet is often four times
larger than the betting volume on the under bet.
Table 1 shows the average objective winning probabilities, betting volumes, bookmaker
closing prices and corresponding betting returns as well as the betting returns from aver-
age bookmaker prices calculated from the prices offered by up to 62 different bookmakers
including Bwin, Ladbrokes and William Hill for both the over and the under bets sepa-
rately. Whereas the objective winning probability, the closing price as well as the returns
from both Tipico and the average bookmaker are very similar for the over and the under
Table 1: Winning probabilities, betting volumes, prices and returns of over/under 2.5 goals bets
winning volume pclosing rclosing rAVG,closing
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE
over 0.498 0.008 0.817 0.003 0.544 0.001 -0.086 0.015 -0.085 0.015
under 0.502 0.008 0.183 0.003 0.539 0.001 -0.068 0.015 -0.063 0.015
∆ -0.005 0.156 0.633*** 0.005 0.005 0.003 -0.018 0.029 -0.022 0.029
Notes: The table presents the results of a simple two-sided t-test for the differences in the objective winning
probability (winning), betting volume (volume), the closing price (pclosing), the return from closing prices
(rclosing) and the returns from the average bookmaker’s closing prices (rAVG,closing) between the over
and the under bet. The number of observations for each test is 4,119. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.
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bets, betting volume is highly concentrated on the over bet, accounting for over 80% of
the total betting volume.
To identify the effect of bettor sentiment on bookmaker pricing we estimate the fol-
lowing two-stage least-squares (2SLS) specification:
rij = β0 + β1 · pij + β2 · ̂volumeij + i
volumeij = θ0 + θ1 · pij + θ2 · overij + vi
(1)
where rij refers to the betting return for each match i and betting contract type j e ∈
{over, under}. pij labels the bookmaker’s price and overij refers to an indicator variable
equaling 1 for the over bet and 0 otherwise. For each match i, we randomly select either
the over or the under bet to ensure independence across observations. The first stage
predicts the betting volume using the indicator variable overij as identifying instrument.
overij is a valid instrument because it is highly correlated with the betting volume due
to a general human preference for a high score. Such bettor sentiment is likely to affect
the betting returns only through the volume wagered, because it is unrelated to potential
confounders such as the winning probability of the favorite team in a match. To control
for a possible influence of the price level on returns, we include the bookmaker’s price in
our specification.
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3 Results
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 report the estimates of the first-stage regressions, which predict
the betting volume. Our instrument over is a strong predictor for the volume with a partial
Table 2: 2SLS regressions of over/under 2.5 goals betting returns
First stage Dependent variable
ropening rclosing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
̂volume -0.032 -0.030
(0.047) (0.047)
popening 1.567*** 0.176
(0.028) (0.213)
pclosing 1.498*** 0.158
(0.026) (0.200)
over 0.624*** 0.626***
(0.004) (0.004)
Partial R2 / R2 87.85% 88.32% 1.24% 1.22%
N 4,119 4,119 4,119 4,119
Anderson canon. corr LR statistic 8,682*** 8,845***
Notes: The table presents 2SLS estimates for the bookmaker returns from opening and closing prices.
The betting volume is instrumented by the over indicator variable. For each match, only one bet (either
over or under) is randomly included. The heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. In all models, *, **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.
R2 of around 88%. Columns 3 and 4 report estimates of the second-stage regressions that
relate betting returns to the predicted betting volume and bookmaker prices. Neither the
opening price, the closing price, nor the betting volume have a significant effect on betting
returns. This finding is robust to the use of an average price calculated from the prices
offered by up to 62 different bookmakers and to the exclusion of the bookmaker price.
Thus, bookmakers do not exploit the bettor preference to bet on a high number of goals
in a soccer match. Instead, bookmakers set the prices according to their best prediction
of the true outcome probability and add an equally distributed commission.
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4 Conclusion
The volume density from the over/under market in soccer is highly concentrated on
the over bet, accounting for over 80% of the betting volume on average. However, this
imbalance is not associated with systematic biases in betting odds. Our 2SLS estimates
show no significant effect of sentimental betting volume on returns.
Bettors can easily compare the odds listed by several different bookmakers and find the
best odds through a number of websites such as oddsportal.com or betbrain.com, which
increases the bettors’ price sensitivity. Thus, small price changes tend to have a large
impact on the betting volume and eventually on the bookmaker’s profit. If a bookmaker
increases the price (lowers the odds) of an over bet, sentimental bettors would switch to
a competitor. On the other hand, if a bookmaker lowers the price (increases the odds)
of an over bet, he gains additional sentimental betting volume, however, at the risk of
substantial losses. We find that bookmakers do not distort their odds in either direction.
They offer odds that reflect their best prediction of the true outcome probability and
add an equally distributed commission, even when bettor sentiment leads to a highly
asymmetric volume distribution.
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